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Introduction
The idea that the prospect of migrating to a developed, technologically advanced country, where the returns to human capital are higher than in the developing home country, induces individuals in the home country to acquire additional human capital initiated a large "New Economics of the Brain Drain" literature (Stark, 2005) . The pioneering writings on this topic, Stark et al. (1997 Stark et al. ( , 1998 , did not deal, however, with the possibility of saving.
A natural question is whether the positive human capital formation response identified in the model of Stark et al. (1998) is robust to the introduction of saving. After all, saving is a device for obtaining less variability in one's lifetime consumption than in income or earnings, so resorting to saving may weaken or even negate the need to employ other instruments; savings could thus "crowd out" the human capital formation response. Whereas there is typically a risk in acquiring human capital, 1 Both saving and human capital formation are means of investing in the future, and an optimizing individual will seek to equalize the marginal returns from them. Indeed, Azariadis and Drazen (1990) , who studied the optimal education decision with an option to save, established that the marginal returns to education and saving are equalized at the interior equilibrium, and that any exogenous factor increasing the productivity of human capital raises the time spent in schooling. However, neither they nor others who pursued similar lines of inquiry (for example, Galor and Stark, 1994) incorporated the consideration of a probable utilization of the acquired human capital in a foreign country as a feature that renders investment in human capital risky. savings can reasonably be assumed to yield fixed and certain returns. The facility of saving as a risk-free investment is of particular relevance for the analysis of Stark et al. (1998) because the main result there is contingent on a particular attitude of the individual towards risk -a low degree of relative risk aversion.
In this paper we ask: can the option to save neutralize ("crowd out") the effect of the prospect of migrating on human capital formation? When saving is an option, under what conditions does the prospect of migrating lead to increased investment in human capital? In particular, when saving is undertaken, does a low degree of relative risk aversion need to be replaced by a more stringent condition for the human capital formation outcome to hold?
A model of human capital formation, savings, and migration
Consider a workforce in a closed economy . . This assumption means that borrowing (incurring debt) in order to finance human capital formation, namely that 0 s < , is not allowed.
Assume now that migration in the second period becomes a possibility, such that with
an H country worker obtains employment in foreign country . F Otherwise, the worker works in H with whatever human capital he has acquired. Human capital is perfectly transferable across countries. To reflect the fact that the foreign country is rich and the home country is poor, it is assumed that the competitive wage per efficiency unit of labor in the foreign country, F w , exceeds the competitive wage per efficiency unit of labor in the home country, H w . Wages in H and in F are independent of migration (that is, migration is relatively small), and the rate of return on savings, 0 r ≥ , is exogenously given.
Let
1 r δ = + . Then, the worker's income in the second period will be ( ) Per period utility, which is given by the function ( ) U x , is derived from periodic
The worker's optimization problem involves choosing l and s that maximize his intertemporal utility
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1 )
where
is the worker's subjective time rate of discount.
We assume that
implies that the worker does not save his entire first-period income. Given the limit properties of the production function of human capital, and given the properties of the utility function, the fraction of the endowment of labor allocated to human capital formation is positive, but less than one, namely
The model of Stark et al. (1998) is a special case of the model described above without a possibility of saving, namely, in the Stark et al. (1998) model the worker maximizes (1) under the constraint 0 s = . Then, Stark et al. (1998) show that if the condition
is fulfilled for all l , the optimal level of human capital is higher in the presence of a prospect of migrating than in its absence. Any utility function . Assuming this condition is tantamount to assuming that the worker's preferences exhibit a coefficient of relative risk aversion ( RRA ) that is less than one, namely that
. Intuitively, for a worker to engage in the risky ( 1) p < acquisition of more human capital in anticipation of the high returns to human capital available in the foreign country only to end up not migrating and not reaping those returns, the worker has to exhibit low aversion to risk. 
We obtain the properties of the solutions to the maximization problem that follows from (1) upon drawing on the necessary Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, which are determined by the derivatives of (1) with respect to l and s , namely, by 
and
respectively. Because we can restrict our attention to the case of (0,1) l ∈ , it follows from (3) that ( ) The effect of the probability p of migrating on human capital formation is
We denote by p l  the optimal fraction of labor endowment allocated to human capital formation in the model of Stark et al. (1998) . Without an option to save, the effect of a probability of migrating on human capital formation is
We first formulate a lemma which allows us to characterize the optimal fraction of the endowment of labor allocated to human capital formation in terms of the relationship between the marginal returns to the fraction of the endowment of labor allocated to human capital formation at the optimum, namely, ( ) p l φ′ , and the marginal returns to savings, δ . When migrating is not possible ( 0) p = , both human capital formation and saving are riskless. We expect the worker to form human capital up to the point at which a further increase in future consumption is not desirable, or up to the point at which the marginal returns from investment in human capital are equal to those that accrue from saving. When migrating is a possibility Proof. See the Appendix.
We next show that if, in the closed economy, the returns to saving are so unattractive compared to the returns that accrue from the formation of human capital that the worker does not save, then, other things held constant, the appearance of a prospect of migrating will not cause the worker to save. The next lemma formalizes this intuitive reasoning. Stark et al. (1998) , and a positive probability of employment in a foreign country leads to the formation of more human capital under the condition
for all l . Lemma 2 implies that a configuration in which a worker switches from not saving when the economy is closed to saving when the economy is open is not possible.
As the following two claims show, the opportunity to save that is exercised by a worker does not negate the human capital acquisition effect identified in Stark et al. (1998) . 
Conclusions
We expanded the setting introduced in Stark et al. (1998) and in Stark et al. (1997) , and established the robustness of the finding in Stark et al. (1998) that the prospect of migrating increases optimal human capital formation. We showed that when saving is possible, the sufficient condition needed to yield this result is the same as in Stark et al. (1998) , namely, we require the worker's preferences to exhibit a low degree of relative risk aversion. Moreover, a worker who saves when a prospect of migrating presents itself acquires more human capital than he would have acquired without a prospect of migrating even if the condition specified in Stark et al. (1998) is not satisfied.
In addition, we find that a worker who saves when migrating is not possible, and who does not save when migrating is possible, increases his investment in human capital in response to the prospect of migrating by more than in a comparable setting without an option to save.
The importance of these findings stems from the fact that developing countries differ in the level of their financial development, and whereas in some countries saving is more attractive and practiced fairly widely, in others saving is much less prevalent. Thus, our findings accord a degree of universality to the effect of the prospect of international migration on human capital formation.
